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ABSTRACT 
"Unreasonable risk" is a key term in the Toxic Substances 
Control Act, A finding that a chemical "may present an unreasonable 
risk" must be made before testing can be required, under section 4a 
of the Act; a finding of "presents or will present an unreasonable 
risk" must be made before a chemical can be regulated under section 6a. 
In the act and legislative history, "unreasonable risk" was defined 
in very general terms as a balancing of the probability of harm, the 
severity of harm, and benefits of the chemical in question, The 
Environmental Protection Agency was delegated the respo·nsibility to 
define a legal concept of unrasonable risk, I wrote this paper while 
in residence at the Office Pesticides and Toxic Substances (EPA) as part 
of the effort to define "unreasonable risk" for regulatory purposes. 
This paper develops a concept of unreasonable risk based on 
economic efficiency. Three ingredients are brought together in a 
common framework: baseline or existing information; the characteristics 
of a test, if testing is to be an option; and the valuation of the 
costs and benefits of the various control options. 
The framework is designed to accomodate "typical" character­
istics of toxics problems: "zero-infinity" dilemmas and the low 
statistical power of tests, Because of pervasive uncertainties in 
both baseline information and in new information, several rules of thumb 
and policy directions are suggested. A complete definition of un­
reasonable risk would go beyond minimization of expected costs to 
incorporate considerations of equity. 
A FRAMEWORK FOR UNREASONABLE RISK 
IN THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 
Talbot Page 
The purpose of this paper is to put three ingredients of 
a concept of unreasonable risk into a common framework. The 
ingredients are: baseline or existing information, the 
characteristics of the test or combination of tests, and the 
valuation of the costs and benefits of the various control 
options. The framework permits systematic consideration of 
the cost of testing and the value of new information from 
testing. I will focus directly on some aspects of the cost 
and incompleteness of information but I will leave out others 
or just touch upon them, as they go beyond the goal here. 
Let me mention from the start that I do not think that it is 
always necessary to know very much about each of these three 
ingredients before mating a finding of "presents an 
unreasonable risk. " (This finding in Section 6a leads to 
precautionary regulation) or " may present an unreasonable 
risk" (this finding in Section 4 a  leads to testing. ) When 
the costs of information are taken into account the framework 
suggests procedures which operate on highly incomplete 
information. 
TSCA and the legislative history offer considerable· 
discretion to the 1'.dministrator in developing a concept of 
unreasonable risk. The legislative history calls for a 
balancin� of costs, benefits, and risks, but not necessarily 
formal, quantitative cost-benefit analysis. y Although 
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there is increasing interest in introducing risk-benefit 
(or cost-benefit) analysis into regulatory decision-making 
and there is increasing use of quantative risk assessment 
for carcinogens, there seems to be some confusion as to what 
such analysis means in the areas of environmental risks, 
where information is highly incomplete. For this paper, a 
risk-benefit approach does not mean that for a chemical all 
the costs, benefits, and probabilities are to be numerically 
estimated in some fashion or other, toted down to some bottom 
line which tells us whether to regulate or not. Instead the 
idea is to develop a balanced view of the costs and 
probabilities of regulatory options--including the option of 
no action--and to suggest procedures so that in the long run 
the expected cost of regulation is minimized. 
"J.'he approach here attempts to strike a balance between 
two risks. The first is the risk of taking precautionary 
action for a chemical which is safe (a regulatory false 
positive) . The second is the risk of not controllini a 
chemical which is unsafe, and which would be controlled with 
be�ter information (a regulatory false negative) • In the 
majority of cases for potentially toxic chemicals, decisions 
are made under pervasive uncertainty. A decision to postpone 
precautionary action until there is better data is just as 
much a decision under uncertainty as a decision to take 
precautionary action in the meantime. In fact, the crucial 
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decision is what to do "in the meantime " while uncertainties 
are far fro m resolution. The central fact ab out decisionmaking 
under uncertaint y  is that the risk of a false  pos itive ''trades 
off" against  the risk of a false  negative . The risk of a 
f alse positive can be reduced, but at the price of increas ing 
the ris k  of a fal s e  neg ative. The essence of the balancing 
process is a willingne s s  t o  accept s ome false  pos itives as 
the unavoidable  means of controlling false negatives . How 
many false positives should be accepted for each fals e  neg ative 
depends up on the relative costs  and probabilities  of the two 
risks . We may not be  able t o  tell with precision jus t  how many 
false positives should be accepted for each fals e  neg ative , 
but we can sharpen our perspective b y  s e tting out the basic 
ingredients , considering the t yp ical asynnnetries and features 
of toxics problems ,  and putting them t ogether in a common 
framework. 
In general terms the approach is an e xtention of the one 
used b y  Learned Hand in a liability case having t o  do with a 
b arge which broke loos e  from its pier. �/ Hand defined three
variables : the probability that the ves se l  will  break awa y  (P) ; 
the gravit y  of the injury (L); and the b urden of adequate 
precautions (B). In this case "adequate precaution" would
have meant having a bargeman in attendance . The duty of the 
bargeowner to have a bargeman in attendance, and hence liability, 
depended as Hand wrote it, on whether B<PL, or whether 
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the cost  of precautionar y  action was less than the expected 
cost of the uncontrolled situati on .  Hand did not attempt to 
quantify the variables,  but noted that when a s t or m  threatens 
P is higher, and the dut y  of the b argeowner to take precautionary 
action clearer . In other words , Hand made use of  a simple 
expected cost framework for a qualit ative analysis . 1/
Hand's analysis deal t  with the evaluation o f  e xi s t ing 
information .  For the man agement of p otentially toxic chemicals  
the s ituation is  complicated b y  the opportunity of  g athering 
new information through testing.  With the opportunity to 
test the ques t ion arises  as how to evaluate new inf ormation 
and fit it together with exist ing information .  Tes ts  
are s tatistical and quantitative in nature and their 
performance is characterized by two prob abilitie s , both 
calculab le for specific effects of concern.  These  are the 
prob abilities of fail ure : (1)  the prob ability that the test  
will "find" a nonexis tent effect, which the prob ability of 
a test false  positive and is traditionally denoted a; 
(2) the prob ability that the tes t  will  miss  an e xis ting effect,
which is ·  the prob ab il i t y  of a test false  negative and is 
· tradionall y  denoted $. Thus , in the absence of  tes t ing,
Hand was c once rned with one probability, which char acterized 
the exis ting b aseline information ;  with the additional 
pos s ibility of testing we are concerned with three. 
The most distinguishing feature of Hand's approach, 
when applied to the toxic chemicals problem, is that it 
treats the roles of false positives and false negatives 
symmetrically. This is in contrast with other approaches 
which devote more explicit attention and importance, in a 
decision sense, to the role of false positives. 
Three Characteristics for the Framework 
The three ingredients correspond to three 
characteristics of the toxic chemicals problem. I discuss 
these and other characteristics elsewhere in more detail, !/ 
but the following three are the most essential: 
(1) The first asymmetry, between the potential costs 
and benefits. Many toxic chemicals problems involve adverse 
hypotheses, which, if true, lead to catastrophic costs. 
Often the costs of precaution are large, in the millions or 
hundreds of millions of dollars. But compared with the 
potential magnitude of the catastrophic effect, if the 
adverse hypothesis is true, the costs of precaution are 
relatively modest. Tris, PCBs, asbestos, and CFCs all have 
aspects which illustrate this asymmetry in potential costs. 
In terms of Hand' s notation L, gravity of the injury, may 
typically be large compared with B, the burden of adequate 
precautions. "Catastrophic" is a relative concept, and we 
are really concerned with the ratio L/B. 
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The asynunetry in potential costs  is not the same for 
every problem;  it is s tronger for CFCs as aeros ol propellants 
than for CFCs as  refrigerants . For s ome problems like that 
of carb on dioxide and the greenhouse effect,  the cos t  of 
con tr ol ( subs tantial decreas e  in fossil fuel combus tion) may 
not be relativel y  s mall compared with the potential c osts  of 
climate change . We want a framework des igned t o  take this 
p otential as ymmetry int o  account,  with flexibility for different 
degrees of it,  t o  cases  where there may be no asymmetry at all . 
( 2 )  The second as ymmetry, between the probab il ity of 
the benign hypothesis and the probability of the adverse 
hypothesis . Often there is a low probability a ttached to the 
adverse hyp othesis ,  especially an adverse hyp othes is about 
a potential worse  cas e . In the ozone depletion examp le , s ome 
experts have suggested that there might be  about a 1 percent 
chance of s ufficient ozone depletion to melt the ice cap s , 
increase cancer rates s ignificantly, and s evere l y  disrupt the 
climate. Similarly s ome have suggested that here 
might be a one to five percent chance that age-adj us ted cancer 
rates could double in the next twenty years due to the pres ence 
of man-made contaminants . (Others have suggested that this 
likelihood may be subs tantial l y  higher . )  
In Hand's notation this probability or likelihood is P .  
This likelihood i s  not direct l y  calculable , but is an 
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" assesse d" value . It i s  a translation of  all the exi sting 
infonnation into a statement of the leve l  of suspicion about 
the adverse hypothesis. Equivalently,  we could translate the 
exist in g  information into a statement o f  the odds against the 
adverse hypothesis ( N) .�/ We can imagine a scene where the 
exasperated regulator b acks the scientific co mmunity against 
t he wall and says "What is your level of  suspicion? What are 
the odds against t he effect happening?" Scienti st s  (and  
l awyers) are rel uc t ant to  make numerical statement s  abo ut 
uncertainty ; nonethele ss, the re gulator i s  forced,  in a real 
sense, to b et on the likelihoo d of the effect of concern 
whenever he makes a decision toward or away from precaut ionary 
action . 
As a practic al matter it may not be possible  to assess P,  
or equivalent l y  N, with anything close to precision . However, 
it is critic al for the decision proce ss to have some rough 
i dea  whether the existing information points  to a high or low 
level of  suspicion, whether the odds a gainst the environmental 
effect are long or short .  It is al so critically important to 
develop processes whereby we learn how well risk asse ssment is 
done and how it c an be improved .£/ To do this we need to see 
how the level of suspicion fits into the framework. 
The relative l y  low probabil ity often attached to the 
adverse hypothesi s  is the second " t ypical" asymmetry . The two 
asymmetrie s  taken together form what has been called the 
"zero-infinity dile mma" -- a "nearly" zero chance of  a "nearly" 
infinite c atastrophe. We want a framework to allow for this 
secon d  asymmetr y, but ag ain to be flexible  enough to allow 
for different degr ee s  of it , including case s  where the adver se 
hypothesi s  does not have a relatively low probability, or even 
where has b een e stablished with a l arge measure of scientific 
cert ainty.  
( 3 )  Low Power . I t  is common practice in testing for 
carcinogenic and other toxic effect s  to set Q. equal to S percent
°{the prob ability of  a fal se positive is also the significance 
leve l  of the test ) . Whether or not this make s sense for toxic 
chemicals depends in p art on the corresponding � for the effects
of concern .  For the mo st commonly used bioassay for potential 
c arcinogens, for which there are SO animal s in the control
group and SO in each treated group , f3 may be great er
than SO percent . II
If �he test is consi dered positive when it is positive 
for any one of twenty po ssible sit es, the true probab ility 
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of false p ositive sub s t antially increases  over the d. for a
s ingle site ; but when the his torical rate of tumor in the 
controls  is t aken into  acc ount the true Cl is greatly diminished .
Fears et  al . have c alculated that when the rate of tumor in 
the controls  is 1%, the true d for a twenty site experiment
is less than . 2% .  II· For a two dose experiment which is
taken to  be  positive if the test is positive at the s ame 
s ite for b oth doses,  the tradeoff between the true d. and �
is shown in Figure 1 ,  for a potential 10  percent access 
risk, al ong with the n ominal Ci., (nominal �is obt ained by
ignoring informati on on the his t orical rate of tumor in the 
c ontrols) . 
The tradeoff b etweend,and j?> is often es tablished by setting
nominal QI.equal t o  5 percent.  For the c alculated example, 
this suggests  that we may routinely design and interpret 
tests  with true ct f ar less  than 1 percent and � as high as 
74  percent,  for a p otential excess  risk of 10 percent ( the 
most upper p oint in Figure 1) . It  doesn't make much sense 
to h ave such a skewed tr adeoff, s o  highly protective agains t  
the false positive and s o  weakly protective agains t  the 
false  negative .  �/ One of the mos t imp ortant features of 
the b al ancing approach, in an operation al sense,  is much 
gre ater attenti on t o  the calculation of false p ositive and 
false  neg ative error rates . At present,  analyses  of � ( and
trued,) are rare, b oth in epidemiologic studies and clinical 
tests . We consider below the app lication of the b alancing 
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concept for a determination of the tradeoff between ex. and � 
based on minimizing expected cost. 
As a general observation, it appears that for many 
toxics problems , adverse effects , when they exist,  are 
hidden with the consequence that e ven expensive ,  well  designed 
tes t s  h ave l ow prob abilities of dis covering effects  when 
they exist .  It would be des irable,  for examp le,  t o  be  able 
to have b oth':£. and � less than 5 percent,  but for this test in 
Figure 1 there is no way to get b oth below ab out 2 5  percent . 
The property I have called l ow p ower, typically as s ociated 
with toxics problems , c an be l oosely res t ated as s aying that 
the ( d.,{?>) tradeoff curve for effects of concern is "far" from
the origin in a characteristics diagr am such as Figure 1 .  
Ag ain, the framework, should all ow for this charac teristic,  
enc ouraging explicit attention and investig ation of it,  
while providing flexibility t o  handle c ases where it does 
not obt ain . 
To s unnnarize s o  far, the fr amework should be able to take 
into acc ount the three char ac teristics with sufficient flexi-
bility for varying degrees of e ach or all the char acteris tics . 
In its "pure" form, when the charac teris tics are strong , the 
problem of controlling a potentially toxic.chemic al can be 
comp ared with searching for a needle in a hays t ack . First  
of all the needle may not be  in the haystack at all ( the low 
probability of the adverse 
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hypothesis ) . But if the needle is in the haystack, it is 
likely to be hard to find (low power). None theles s ,  if  the 
needle is present and if we mis s  it there will  be catas trophic 
costs  (the infinity-ne s s  of the dile unna ) .  The potentially 
catastrophic costs  are high in comparison with the cost o f  
precautionary control which would keep the needle, o r  what we 
think may be the needle, from entering the hays tack in the 
first place.  
Carcino gens in Drinkin g Water: An Illus tration 
The three ingredients are brought together in a study of 
carcinogenic risk in drinking water . �/ Figure 2 shows the
result of an anlysis of the statistical power, a particular 
regression e quation in the study. The s tatistical power , and 
hence �· are sho wn as a function of the magnitude o f  the
potential drinking water effect, for a givend..=.05, 10/ Even 
though the drinking water variable is highly significant in 
the regression equation, the statistical power for the 
estimated effect, an excess of 60 cancers per million 
annually, is only about 4 5  percent. In other words, even if 
the statistical model were correctly specified (there is 
almost always some specification error as there is in this 
case), and even if the true effect of carcinogens in drinking 
water were to increase the gastrointestinal cancer rate by 
60 per million, there would be less than half a chance of 
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finding it by this statistical test (the test was considered 
positive if the t value was greater than 2.0, for a 
confidence level of 95 percent) . 
Further regression anal ysis  suggests that the drinking 
water effect might occur in cancers of the urinary tract as 
well as gas trointes tinal s ites ,  and for comparison the 
drinking water effect is also expressed as a percent of the 
total gas trointestinal and urinary tract cancer rate in 
Figure 3 .  On the basis  o f  o ther existing info rmation, at 
the time the first  regres sion aquations were reported, it was 
wide l y  held that the drinking water effect ,  if it existed at  
all,  was small . Counnentators did not trans late their level 
o f  suspi cion about the exis tence of the e ffect into an 
explicit pro bability as s essment ,  but it appeared that an 
e ffect in the range from 0 to 3 or 4 percent was cons i.dered 
most  likel y, a range from 5 to 20 percent plausi ble but
unlikel y, and anything over about 30  percent to be extremely  
unlikel y. 
The benefits o f  control are the reduction of  human cancers,  
mutagenic and other toxic effect s ,  and o ther damage to  the 
eco s ys tem (humans being cons idered part of the eco s ystem). · 
Of thi s ,  only the cost of  cancer was even c rudely quantified, 
(but with some attention to the problem of intergenerational 
equit y). These benefits ,  on a s teady s tate basis o f  comparison, 
were taken to be $500, 000 per life saved, and correspond to 
Hand's L .  The cost of  control ,  by 
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means of granular activated carbon (GAC) , was estimated to 
be $ 10 . 3  million for a city of 1 , 193 , 000 . Thi s  corresponds 
to Hand's B .  The cost -benefit ratio, for GAC control , 
increase s  linearl y  with magnitude of  the drinking water effect , 
and hence the number of deaths to be prevented . 
There i s  a simple and direct relationship between the 
cost -benefit rati on L/B and the cost of a fal se negative 
relative t o  the cost of a fal se positive . If preventative 
action i s  taken when there i s  no drinking water effect , the 
cost of this mistake is the unnecessary cost of carbon 
treatment B .  If preventative action i s  not under taken when 
the drinking water effect i s  substantial , the cost of  thi s 
mistake i s  the cost of the environmental harm over and above 
the co st it would have taken t o  control it , or L-B . Thus in 
Figure 3 the ratio of the co st s of mistake s is (L-B) /B  and 
is plotted one unit  below the co st-benefit ratio , labeled D 
for future reference .  11/  
Fo r practical purpo se s  de cisionmaking the region of  
concern i s  ver y roughl y from 0 to 100  excess cancers per 
million , ·whe re the excess carcinogenic risk i s  at least 
plausible , even if considered unlikely. If the effect were 
known to be less than 3 or 4 percent , it is unlikel y  that 
any action would betaken , as the cost- benefit ration for 
cancer risk would appear to be less than one ( other control 
such as changing the point of chlorination might still  be 
taken) . Where the effect of concern seems plausible from 
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exi sting information , in the range of 5 to 20 percent o f  
background , the cost- benefit ratio i s  favorable for preventa ­
tive action .  Howeve r,  for most o f  this range the statist i cal 
p ower of the te st i s  low . An effect of  60 excess cancers per 
million is clearly large enough to warrant considerable 
p reventative action , but the effe ct is still  too sma l l  to  find 
easi l y  by statistical te st s. All this is another way of 
saying that managing the toxic chemicals pro blem is l ike 
looking f or needles in a haystack. 
Balancing: A Numerical Example 
Having de scribed the ingredients,  we are now ready to 
put them toge the r in a framework that uses the notion o f  
least expected cost . I'll start with a concrete ill ustration 
wi ch incorporates the two asymmetries of the zero- inf inity 
dilennna and the test characteristics. Even though simp lifie d ,  
the example remains a bit complicated , as  i t  must t o  reflect 
the nature of the toxics problem. In the examp le infonnation 
is more comp lete than ordinarily is the case in toxics problems 
this i s  done to help fix ideas to see the relationship s 
amon g  the ingredient s. With the example in mind , the framework 
i s  then illustrated by means of a diagram . The framework can 
be interp reted in qualitative terms and we can begin to 
ask what are sensible cour ses of action when information i s  
le ss complete and more co stly .  
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The example . You are feeling a little rotten and you 
go to  an eminent doc t or with a wide practice .  "Ye s ," says 
the doctor after his examination, "it is probabl y  nothing, 
b ut there is a small chance that you may have s omething 
s e rious . One pers on in twenty with your s ympt oms has a 
particular, rare b ut s eri ous cancer . "  
Your concern aroused, you want to  know h ow the doctor 
has assigned the 19  to  1 odds against the disease,  " I  keep a 
a track record, " says the doctor. "I have followed up 
many thousands of patients with your symptoms. When we 
operate we can tell right away whether or not there is 
cancer. For those we don't operate on we can tell one way 
or the other in five years. " My colleagues tell me that I 
am a fanatic for record-keeping." 
"What about the cancer?" The doctor is reassuring. 
"It is too early to worry about cancer. You could walk 
away from the office right now with the odds strongly in 
your favor. But, he adds quickly, "I don't recommend this, 
because it is a nasty tumor (in the remote chance you have 
it) . I have a very good test; take that and in two weeks 
we'll decide what to do." 
He describes the test,  which turns out to  be painful and 
even a little disfiguring. 
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"What ab out the operation? There is no p oint in taking 
the test if I don't go through with the operation, if the 
tes t  is p ositive . "  
He describes the operation and it  appears t o  you that the 
cost  of the operation, in pain, recouperati on, permanent 
impairment,  and doctors bills , is small compared with the 
prospect of the cancer. The doc t or adds that the operation 
is c ompletely s ucce s sful,  " if we nip the tumor in the b ud . "  
"And what happens if I do not take the tes t  and I turn 
out to  be that unlucky one in twenty?" 
"Then you will  die . " 
You turn your attention back to  the tes t .  "How accurate 
is it?" " I  have kept careful records . Those who have the 
tumor s c ore p ositive on the test 90 percent of the time . 
Those who do not have the tumor score negative on the tes t  
90 percent of the time ." 
You p onder this inf ormation .  You have no way of j udging
this matter precisely, b ut dying of the cancer is ten times
worse than the operation you roughl y guess . Compared wi th 
these p otential cos t s ,  the c os t  of the test  is a mere annoyance
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("inconvenience" the doctor puts it) . The test appears 
highly accurate, so you decide to follow the doctor's 
recommendation and take it, Two weeks later you return 
for the results. "Sit down, " says the doctor. "You have 
a serious but not fatal problem--the test came out positive 
--I recommend the operation, as a precaution." 
"But almost surely I must have cancer, since the test 
is positive. Why as a precaution?" 
The doctor reassuringly, "I have kept careful records 
and made the calculation. This positive test result means 
only that you have a 32 percent chance of having the tumor." 
You are astonished, but he keeps going. "Even though the 
odds are still almost two to one in your favor, I recommend 
the operations, as a precaution." 
"Isn't there some alternative, " you say. "I hate to 
have an operation when the chances are that it is 
unnecessary." 
"There is another alternative. We can reinterpret the 
test to be more sensitive against false positives. By 
changing the 'critical value' of the test we can halve the 
probability of a false positive--it was 10 percent but it can
be reduced to 5 percent, which is the value used by many 
statisticians. " Just as you perk up, the doctor continues, 
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"Unfortunately,  in doing s o ,  the sens itivity of the tes t  to 
protect agains t false ne gatives goes down. In the tes t  I 
recomme nd ,  the probability of a false ne gative is 0 . 1 , but 
in the alterna tive tes t  with the lower probability of a false  
p os itive the probabil ity of a false  negative goes up to 0 . 5 .  
I t's a trade off, and I rec ommend the original tes t. The way 
mos t people val ue the ir lives , it leads to lower cos ts , on 
average ." 
You decide to take the operation because you don't want 
to l ive with the prospect  of even a 32 percent chance of the 
cancer when you can avoid the gamble at relatively low cos t, 
and you take the doc tor at his word on the trade-off of 
false  p os itives a nd false ne ga tives . 
After the operation, at one of the routine checkups 
for the s urgery ,  you thank the doc tor for the skill of his 
knife a nd the candor of his advice . "By the way , "  you ask , 
"did I have the tumor?" 
"No,  you were one of the 66 percent for whom the operation 
turns out to be an unnecessary precaution. " 
You don't c omplain becaus e  you knew the odds were in 
your favor before the operation and there is ·no sens e  of wishing 
you had the tumor to "j us tify" the operation . You ask him 
fur ther about his approach . 
19 
"I really follow a very simple s trate gy, " the doc tor 
responds . "With rarer tumors or ones  that are les s severely 
malignant, I wait and watc h, But I take a conservative 
approach with this one .  Even at the s tage where the baseline 
information indicate s  only a five percent chance that the 
advers e  hypothesis is true, I reco rmnend taking the tes t  and 
following i t  wi tho ut developing further information . For this 
tumor there is high cos t  of  waiting, as the operation becomes 
less effective the longer yo u wai t, but I wo ul d be buried in 
malpractice s uits if I didn't keep comp lete records and fully 
inform the patients before the opera tions . "  
"I s uppose  that every once in a while one o f  the people 
you operate on who turn o ut no t to have the tumor get sore . 
With onl y  a 32 percent chance o f  cancer on a tes t  positive, 
you mus t  expe ct about two unneces s ary o perations on 
people without tumors for e ach operatio n  with a tumor." 
"The mis take ratio is a lot wors e  than that.  I have kept 
track of my two types of mis takes . With my follow-up s tudies 
I can tell  how many people were diagnosed as positive, had 
operations , but who were ac tually tumor- free --my false pos itives . 
And I have kep t track of the peop le who were diagnos e d  as 
ne ga tive, didn't have the operation, but who later died of  the 
tumor - - my false  negatives .  For every patient who s l ips  by 
with an undiagnos e d  tumor I have 19 operations on tumor- free 
patients . Allowing these 19  false  pos i tives  is the price pai d 
to control false negatives . "  
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Again you expres s  as tonis hme nt. Is this doctor re ally 
s triking the bes t  balance betwee n the two types o f  mistake s ?  
There is no tr ick here, the criterion o f  expe cted cos t  
minimization, which the doctor is following, le ads to more 
pre cautionar y action, whe n  there are the two as ymmetrie s  o f  
the zero-infini ty dilemma, tha n  o ne mi ght cas ually e xpect, 
es pe cially in terms o f  the least cos t  ratio n o f  mis takes 
the ratio o f  false posi tives to false ne gati ves .  
The doctor has fo ur s trate gies . (1) Conclude that the 
base line information ("yo ur s ymptoms ") is s trong e no ugh to 
warr ant the pre cautio nary operation wi thout the tes t. This 
corres ponds to a fi ndi ng o f  a "prese nts an unreaso na ble ris k" 
for direct re gulation under s e ctio n  6(a). (2) Conclude that 
the base line informatio n  is we ak e no ugh to re as s ure the 
patient and neither tes t  nor o per ate. This corres po nds to 
a findi ng· that there is not an unreas onable ris k  as in 
section 5(g). (3) Tes t  and follow its res ult, wi th the tes t  
s tandard adjusted to a 0.1 pro bability o f  both false 'pos iti ve 
and false ne gative. (4 ) Tes t  and follow its res ult, with 
the te .s t s tandard adjusted to a 0. 05 pro babi lity o f  a false 
pos itive and a 0.5 pro bability o f  false ne gati ve. These 
las t two corre s pond to a fi nding o f  "may presents" for 
s ection 4(a), leading to tes ti ng. There are other alternatives ,  
s uch as paying the cos t  o f  impro ving the base line informatio n 
before deciding whe ther or not to tes t  (in the example, 
waiting for more advanced symptions or in TSCA performing 
an exhaustive literature search, while delaying action in 
the meantime on t he chemical at hand and other chemicals  in 
the queue) . This t oo can be analyzed in an expected co st 
framework, but here I want t o  keep the details to a minimum .  
Fi gure 4 s hows why the probability o f  having cancer ,
when the test is positive, is only 32 percent. As can be 
seen by the following branches, the predictive power of the 
test is substantially weakened by the underlying rarity of 
the effect of concern. Although illustrated by a single 
numerical example, this weakening of predictive power by 
the rarity of effect is a general phenomenon, directly 
implied by Bayes Theorem. 12/ 
Immediate observation from Figure 4 shows that when 
a.• i; , the mistake ration is simply (1-P) /P or N. Direct 
observation also shows that when the test is balanced with 
d.. • �, we should expect more test negatives than positives 
when we are testing a group of chemicals each one of which 
we believe to have a less than even chance of having the 
effect of concern. Thus by keeping score on the total number 
of test positives and test negatives, and later discoveries 
of false positives and false negatives, we can develop 
consistency checks on our assessment of the level of 
suspicion (N) and the test characteristics oland �· The 
geometry linking these three variables is shown in Figure 5. 
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Ret urning to  the numerical examp le,  Table 1 summarizes 
the implications of the four strategie s for a group of  1000 
patients with the baseline symptoms.  The "standard o f  proof" 
is defined here as the level of suspicion that the effect exist s, 
at the time a deci sion is made, toward or away from precau­
tionary action, taking int o  account new information from the 
test,  if there i s  a test ,  along with  the previo usl y existing 
information.  In Hand's case, which was decided upon exi sting 
information, there being no test ,  the level o f  susp i cion j ustify­
ing a liability i s  P ,  and a deci sion affirming the owner's dut y  
to provide the bargeman's attendance i s  implied a s  l on g  as 
P > B/L . Because the burden of adequate preca ution i s  small 
compared wit h  the gravit y  of t he barge's sinking, t he probabilit y  
of the barge breaking loose from its mooring can be quite small 
and still have liability required.  We are used to a high 
standard of proof in criminal law, where the cost of a fal se 
p ositive ( convicting the innocent) is large compared wit h  the 
cost of a false negative (acquiting t he guilty) . B ut in t ort 
law, and in the control o f  toxic chemicals, the se relative 
costs are likely to be rever sed, and the standard of proof,  
along with  the rest of  t he decision process reflect the 
relative cost s.  
Row 4 shows that the mi stake ratio is strikingl y  higher 
for the test with  Cl = . 1  compared wit h  the "tradit i onal" 
test wit h  d. = . 0 5 .  
l. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
s. 
6. 
* 
** 
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TABLE l 
STRATEGIES 
don't test; test, operate test operate 
operate if positive; if positive 
Cf.. = 0.1 CL = .OS 
13 = 0.1 p = .s 
Expected number 1000 140 72.S
of operations 
(total positives) 
Expected number 0 5 25 
of deaths (false 
negatives 
Total cost of 1000 190 322.S 
strategy (row 1 
plus ten tillles 
row 2)* 
Mistake ratio 00 19 1.9 
(number of false 
positives for 
each negative) 
Standard of 5% 32% 72% 
proof ** 
Accepted risk *** 0 o.5% 2.5% 
Based on a cost of cancer ten tillles worse than the cost of the operation. 
The rankings of strategies is the same where the total cost is minilllized 
or the expected cost of mistakes. 
Probability of cancer when action is taken. 
*** Probability of regulatory false negative. 
don't test 
don't operate 
0 
so 
500 
0 
5% 
5% 
24 
B alancing: The Framework 
We are now ready to see how the three ingredients fit 
together in a common framework. So far we have considered 
the only cost of the test to be the potential cost of it 
yielding erroneous information. At this point it is a 
simple matter to also take into account the resource cost 
of the test itself, but first let us summarize explicity 
the two extreme strategies where the potential cost of 
erroneous test information leads us to avoid testing 
altogether. If we place a very high cost on a regulatory 
false positive, we may wish to avoid the risk of a test 
false positive altogether by not testing and not taking 
precautionary action. In this case the cost of a 
regulatory false positive is avoided, but at the full risk 
of a regulatory false negative. Since all that really 
matters is the ratio of relative costs, we can count the 
cost of a (regulatory) false positive at one unit and the 
cost of a false negative at D units (Set D = (L-B) /B. 
Then the expected cost of the no test, no control strategy 
with the full risk of a false negative is PD, the likelihood 
of the false negative times its cost. 
At the other extreme we may value the cost of a 
regulatory false negative so highly that we do not want to 
bear the risk that the test entails of a false negative. 
We can avoid risk of a test false negative by taking 
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precautionary action without prior testing. In this 
strategy we bear the full risk of a false positive. The 
false positive, valued at one unit has a level of suspicion 
of probability of (1-P) , hence expected cost of (1-P) . 
In between these extremes we test and condition action 
on the results  of the test.  We also bear the reso urce 
cost of  the test ,  which we can count in units T, relative to 
the cost o f  control .  The expected cost o f  the test ing 
strate gy is PD� + ( 1 -P) d + T .  
In order to adj ust the scale t o  accommodate fi gure 6 ,  
we divide each o f  the se expected cost s  by P D  and recall  that 
( 1 -P) /P = N, the odds against the effect . Simple geometr y  
shows the relative rankings o f  the expected cost s  for each 
strategy .  It can be seen from the geometry how the rankings 
of the expected co st s  depend on the interac tion of a l l  three 
in gredients:  the val ue of new information from the test,  
summarized by the (ct.�) tradeoff curve ; the existin g  in�or­
mation translated into a statement of  the level of  suspicion (N) ; 
and the relative cost s  of  precaution and the potential risk (D) . 
The framework is a general one . It encompasses what I· 
have suggested is the paradigm toxics pro blem : low power, 
where the («.�) tradeoff c urve is "close "  to being a diagonal ;
high cost o f  a fal se negative to the cost o f  a 
fal se positive ,  D " significantly" hi gher than one ; and low 
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probability of the adverse hypothesis, or at least a worst 
case statement of it, N "significantly" higher than one. 
the framework also encompasses cases where any or even all 
these characterist ics do not o btain .  N or D can be less than 
one, the (C(,�) trade -off curve close to the or igin . Thus the
framework is really a language to talk a bo ut the toxics 
problem. It gives us a vocabulary but does not force us into 
narrow specific a s s ump tions . By providing a vocabulary and 
grammar linking the vocabulary, it enco urages us to inves tigate 
empirically t he degree to which actual toxics problems take on 
the paradigm c haracteris t ics . The framework enco urages us to 
ass e s s  the s trengths of the three ingredients for actual toxics 
problems to decide what ,  if any, precaut ionary act ion is 
prudent ,  in a balancing sense .  
The balancing approach of this framework differs funda­
mentally from the alternative approach which requires that the 
risk be first  establ ished before cos t s  are taken into acco unt . 
This may mean resolving the s cientific uncertainties , and 
when performing statis t ical tes t s ,  setting cl at 5 percent, 
without cal culating �· In arguing a gainst the CFC aerosol
ban, the American Chemical Society said the proposed ban 
would be " a  very dangerous precedent" because it would be 
"the first regulation to be based ent irely on an unverified. 
s cientific predict ion . "  13/ In this a lternat ive approach 
cons ideration of the cos t  of precaut ionary control relative 
to the potential environmental harm comes only after the risk 
is es tablished . In the words of Carmen Guarino, Water 
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Connniss ioner of Philadelphia ,  " If f ut ure research proves a 
true l ink between water-borne organics and cancer in humans,  
Philadelphia will spend whatever is necessary to cope with 
the pro blem .  14/ In Hand's notation we must first  prove the 
P is clos e  to one ,  then take precautionary action if B�L .  The 
prohlem with this approach is o bvio us :  it offers no protection 
against  zero - infinity dilemmas . The CFC aerosol ban was an 
applica tion o f  the balancin g  approach:  even tho ugh ozone 
depletion by CFCs was indeed only a s cientif ic hypothesis at 
the time of  the ban , precaut ionary action was taken largely 
becaus e  the potential environmental costs  were perceived to 
be enormo us compared with the cos t  of the ban . 
Somewhat differently, it also has been s ugges ted that 
risk management proceed in two s ta ges  where in the first  stage 
the s cien t is t s  and s tatis ticians do a risk e s t imation and in 
the s e cond s ta ge the economists  and p ublic policy people 
assess  the risk in terms of  the relative cos t s . 1 5/ It is 
conceivable that risk management co uld proceed along these 
lines with the two groups working s eparately, if the pr�cess  
is cons ide red to  be an iterat ive one and s ufficient information 
is passed between them and if each respond to each other's 
needs , but there needs to be cons iderably more commun ication 
among t he va rious discip l ines than currently exis t s . It can . 
be s een fro m a glance at Figure 5 that N (ostens ibly the 
p rovin ce of the s cientists )  and D (os tensively the province 
of the economists )  play interactive and in places ent irely 
symmetric roles .  
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In o rder for the scientist s  to know what chemical s  to 
choose ,  how to p rioritize them , how to pick the tests, and 
how to choose the p roper tradeoff of  oL and �, the y must have
some idea o f  D. Thi s  does not mean that a co st benefit 
analysi s  should be done prior to the test , conditioned on 
all po ssible outco mes of the test .  Requiring thi s doe s  not 
make sense in terms of the cost of info rmation , and is like 
requiring Bobby Fi scher to write down in advance all his 
possible countermoves conditioned on each move his opponent 
might make . Clearl y  there are enormo us co st savings if the 
game is analyzed a s  it goe s  along.  Cont rol  option s for 
toxics, like the moves in a che ss game , are too numerous to 
analyze in full  quantitative detail befo rehand . Still , j ust 
as Fischer comes to the board with anal yzed openings in his 
head, the scientist s  must have some partial idea of D. 
The policy statement of the proposed rule requiring 
testing of chlorobenzenes is in accord with the framework. 
In terms of Figure 5, if D were known to be very small, 
or N known to be very large, the slope N/D would be large 
and any tangent to the (a,�) trade-off curve would cut the 
y-axis above 1, when translated upward by the test cost T. 
This means that the expected cost of the no test, no 
control strategy is less than that of testing, or taking 
precautionary action without testing. 
Thus i s  N were known to be sufficiently large and D known 
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t o  b e  sufficiently small we could make a finding that there is 
no unrea sonable ri sk to the chemical (an finding co rre sponding 
to no test and no control) . Howeve r, neither N or D are 
known with any preci sion . To make a finding that the chemicals 
"may p resent an unreasonable risk" we need some assurance that 
N "may" be small eno ugh and D "may" be la rge enough so that 
a tangent to the t rade- off curve with slope -N/D could cut 
the y-axi s  below 1 .  As a p ractical de cision rule , we requi re 
that the re is at least some evidence o f  toxicity ( some evidence 
that N<oo) and some evidence that there will be potential 
expo sure ( some evidence that D> -1) . The evidence can be 
weak in both case s, e specially  if the co st of  the test is 
relativel y  low , compared with the potential envi ronmental harm, 
and still  warrant the "may p resent s" finding .  Although the 
unce rtainties themse lves may be large. It is impo rtant that 
we have a " reasonable basis, " or reasona ble methodology in 
which the unce rtainties are taken into account.  16/ 
Once a test is unde rtaken, the level o f  suspicion , N ,
is updated , and if the test is sugge stive o f  control  action , 
D is analyzed mo re carefully ,  with specific control op tion s in 
mind, · to see whethe r the "presents an unreasonable ri sk" finding 
is warranted , along with the subsequent precautionary control . 
If there i s  no test (or if there is a test and N is undated) 
the cri te rion fo r the "present s" finding is whether or  not N< D,  
which is j ust a re statement of  Hand's crite rion B�PL . To be 
meaningful, these conditions need to be translated into 
specific policy direction, a few of which are suggested 
below. 
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Policy Steps Toward t he Balancing Approac h 
1 .  Traditionally in epidemiologic and experimentally 
controlled s t udies of  potentially toxic chemicals , d. levels 
are pre-set ,  us ually at 5 percent , and� levels , for the 
effects of  conce rn ,  are not calculated . To move toward 
a balancing approach, proba bilities of fal s e  negatives must 
be routinely calculated . Witho ut s uch  analyses there is no 
way o f  balancing t he risk of a false  negative agains t  the 
risk of  a false pos itive . 
In recent years industry groups have increasingl y asked 
for negative findings to be taken into account in the regulatory 
process .  However, t here is literally no information content in 
a ne gative finding unles s t here is an anal ysis  of  s tatistical 
power , or equivalently t he pro ba bility of a false  negative . 
Thus statis tical power anal yses are a necessary first  s tep 
toward taking negative findings into acco unt . S uc h  analyses 
are also a requisite for deciding what is a "positive" test  and 
how sequential tests  can be des i gned to minimize t he cost of 
regulation , 
2 . In t he Environmental Protection Agency, mos t  of the 
resources of cos t - benefit analysis have gone into t he s t udy 
of  t he cos ts of control ,  the cos t  of  a false  positive . Becaus e  
of  t he critical role of false  negatives ,  equal o r  more 
reso urces s hould go into the s t udy of the cost of potential 
harm (there is a move already in this direction) . 
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A t  the present time quantification o f  the potential 
costs of environmental harm is r udimentary to put the matter 
delicately .  Altho ugh s uch  quantification is intrinsically 
difficult , and can be self-decept ive if  carried too  far, 
there is little doubt that the a s s es sment of environmental 
cos ts  can be improved .  As can be seen by the framework, the 
assessment .  of  environmental cos ts  need not be precise.  In 
many situations , order of magn i t ude estimates may be eno ugh. 
It makes little sense ,  in decision terms , to have estimates 
of control costs t ha t  are much  more precise t han t he estimates 
of  potential environmental cost -- D is a ratio and it makes  
little sense to  e s t imate the denominator with  muc h greater 
precision t han t he numerator . 
3 .  With  greater attention on the estimation o f  potential 
environmental costs  it becomes correspondin gly more important 
to s tress the equity aspects . Some environmental costs  are 
to be avoided on the grounds o f  unfair dis tribution of  risk 
and cos t  (especially long lived risks falling on s ucceedin g  
generations ) .  As we develop balancin g  notions of unreasonable 
ris � that depend on the aggregative D, we must also develop 
equity notions which depend of t he disaggregated distributi on 
of D, in order not to weight the decision process too heavil y  
in the a ggre gative direction. 
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4 .  Traditionally scientist s are rel uctant to translate 
t he ir knowledge and their uncertainty  about the effect into  
a statement of their level of susp icion . For many practical 
decisions t his translation need not go all t he way into a 
numerical statement of the odds against the effect ,  but a 
move toward a more aggregative and more explicit asse ssment 
of the likelihood of the effect is needed for a balancing 
appr oach. In some exhaustive evaluations of existing informa­
tion ,  the reader is left not having any idea if the scientists 
think there is a 1 0  percent chance of the e ffect occuring or 
a 90 percent chance. ll_/ 
5 .  As risk a ssessment s  become more explicit and quant i-
tative , we need t o  keep score more careful l y, to  evaluate how 
well  the assessment proce ss is working and to  suggest ways of 
improving it . As noted in Figure 5 ,  N ,  ci., and� are related 
to  the numbe r  of p ositive s and ne gative s and the number of 
false positive s and fal se negative s of a test . The relation­
ship s between permit consistency checks to  see of N , d., and �
are cl ose to what we think the y  are.  The balancing approach 
suggest s acceptable ratios of fal se p ositive s to false 
ne gatives, and by keeping score we can try t o  uncover mistake s 
of both t ypes.  T he numerical examp le sugge st s that we should 
have more false p ositives than false negatives, for " t yp ical"  
toxics problems, when we  are minimizing the expected co st . 
B ut we appear to  discover more fal se negative s than fal se 
p ositive s. 18/  Is this beca use the former are easier to discover 
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than t he latter , or are we  far from minimiz in g  expe cted cost , 
or what? 
6 .  For a balancing approach we  need to focus more on 
the val ue of information and it s cost for new chemicals.  We 
need to  ask what is the " be st "  base set of test s  costing 
$25 , 000, $50, 000, or $100, 000, where " be st"  is constr ued 
at least qua l itatively in terms of N ,  D, ct.. and �. and
minimization of cost s. 
7 .  The e ssent ial  princip l e  of a balancing concept of 
unreasonable risk is that  there must be a willingness to  
accept regulatory fal se p ositives a s  the price of controlling 
false negatives .  This principle  should be applied t o  the 
defin ition of categorie s  generally in TSCA and to  the literature 
searches prior to  requirement s  f or te sting. For categor ie s  
the risk of a false positive is the risk of drawin g the 
category boundary too broadly so t hat action is taken on a 
chemical which is really unde servin g  of the action. The 
risk of a fal se negative is the risk of drawing the category 
boundary too nar rowly so that some precautionary a ct ion ( for 
example test ing) is not taken but which in fact reall y  
warrants t he act ion. For literature searche s, the risk of a 
false p ositive means requiring a test of a chemical,  when in 
fact t he te st will be unnece ssary or duplicative . 
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In the balancing appro ach we acknowledge that we are 
making deci sions under uncertainty and that the risk of a 
regulatory fal se negative must be weighed against the risk 
o f  a regulatory false ne gative . The regulatory fal se negative ,
i s  that we may t ake too long on the search on one chemical, 
pre-emp ting reso urces from other chemical s, and unnecessarily 
spend tax dollars on dry holes.  
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Figure 1 
FIFTY ANIMAL BIOASSAY 
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Figure 6
EXPECTED COSTS 
Prob. False negative
oc 
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Slope 
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PROBABILITY OF FALSE POSITIVE 
"Does not present an unreasonable risk" corresponds to 
'the strategy no test, no control. 
"Presents an unreasonable risk" corresponds to the 
strategy no test, precautionary control. 
"May present an unreasonable risk" corresponds to the . 
strategy test and act depending on the result of the test. 
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Footnotes 
l/ The House Report states : 
Because the determination of unreasonable risk involves 
a consideration of probability, severity,  and s imilar 
factors which cannot be  defined in precise terms and is 
not a factual determination but rather requires the exercise 
of j udgment on the part of the person making it, the Committee 
did not attempt a definition of such risk , In general ,  a 
determination that a risk associated with a chemical subs tance 
or mixture is unreasonable involves balancing the probability 
that harm will occur and the magnitude and severity of that 
harm again s t  the effect of proposed regulatory action on 
the availability to society of the benefits of the subs tance 
or mixture,  taking into account the availability of substi­
tutes for the subs tance or  mixture which do not require 
regulation, and other adverse effects which such proposed 
action may have on society . 
The balancing process  described above does  not require a 
formal benefit  cost  analysis  under which a monetary value 
is as signed to the risks associated with a subs tance and 
to the cos t to society of proposed regulatory action on 
the availab ility of such benefits . Because a monetary value 
often cannot be assigned to a benefit or cost,  such an 
analysis would not be very useful . 
As noted above , the Committee recognizes that risk is 
measured no t solely by the probability of harm, but ins tead 
includes elements  both of probability of harm and severi ty 
of harm and thos e  elements may vary in relation to each 
other . Thus , the Administrator may properly find that 
health or the environment are exposed to an unreasonable 
risk by a lesser probability of  a greater harm as  well  as 
by a greater probability of a less er harm . 
(H . Rep t . No . 94- 1341,  94th Cong . ,  2d Sess . ,  7 / 14 / 7 6 ,  
a t  13 - 14 ,  Legis . Hist . 421- 22 ,  footnote omitted . )  · 
�/ United States vs . Carroll Towing Co . 159 F .  2d 169 
( 2nd Cir . 1947)  . 
21 For further discuss ion of the balancing concept of 
unreasonable risk in tort law see Harold Green, "The Role of 
Law in Determining Accep tability of Risk, " paper presented 
at the New York Academy of Sciences  workshop "The Management 
of A�ses�ed Risk for Carcinogens , "  March 1 7 - 19 ,  1 980 . For 
application of qualitative expected cost  minimization for 
the analysis of contract law, see The Economics of Contract 
Law , Anthony Kronman, Richard Posner , Little Brown and Company 
BOSton, 1979  
' 
4 1  
f±./ Talbot Page, "A Generic View of  Toxic Chemicals and 
Similar Risks , "  Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol . 7 ,  No . 2 , 1978 
5/ The relationship is simply P = l/ ( l+N) . Later on the 
rrodds" notation is slightly cleaner, and we shall use it from 
time to time . 
�/ There is already an enormous and growing literature on 
the asses sment of risk . One of the best introductions to risk 
assessment and its p lace in decision making is Howard Raiffa 
Decision Analysis : Introductory Lectures on Choices . For a� 
insightful critique of the expected utility approach see 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Prospect Theory : An Analysis  
of Decision Under Risk, " Econometrica, Vol. 47 ,  No . 2 ,  March 1 9 7 9 ,  
pp . 263 - 9 1 . 
There is also a literature on the evaluation of the accuracy 
of assessment : See,  for example Tversky and Kahneman, Judgmentunder Uncertainty : Heuris tics and Biases " 183 Science 1124,  1974 ;  
Slovic , Kunreuther, and White,  "Decision Processes Rationality 
and Adjus tment to Natural Hazards : "  in Natural Haz�rds : Local,  '
National and Global 187 (G . White ed .  1974) · Baruch Fischhoff 
"The Perception of Risk and Its Influence o� Decision Making , ,',
N . Y .  Academy of  Sc iences Conference on Management of  As sessed 
Risk for Carcinogens , March 1 7 - 9 ,  1980 ; David Grether , "Bayes 
Rule as a Descriptive Model : The Representativenes s  Heuristic , " 
Caltech Social Science Working Paper 245 , Jan . 197 9 ,  Pasadena, Ca . ;
Talbot Page, Keeping Score : Actuarial Approach to Zero-Infinity 
Dilemmas"  in Ener�y Risk Management ( eds . G . T .  Goodman and 
W . D. Rowe) Academic Pres s ,  New York, 1 9 7 9 . 
For a spectacularly incorrect  as sessment of  risk by one of  
the great statisticians s ee R . A .  Fisher , Smoking - - The 
Cancer Controversy : Some Attempts  to  As sess  the Evidence,  
oliver and Boyd, London 1959 . 
ll S traightforward but messy calculation shows that in a one­
tailed Fisher exact tes t  with (nominal) ol equal to 5 percent 
when there is a 2 percent background risk of cancer in the ' 
control s ,  for a particular site,  and a five fold increase in 
the background incidence for that site due to the carcinogen � 
is 54% ., 
I 
'§_/ T . R. Fears ,  R . E .  Tarone,  and K . C .  Chu, "Error Rates for 
Carcinogenicity Screens , "  Cancer Research, Vol . 37 , 1941 - 5 ,  
July 197 7 . The tradeoff between OL and � depends criticaliy on 
the background rate of cancer in the contro ls,  the magnitude 
of the effect of concern, and the decision rule . For a two dos e  
experiment,  for two s exes and two species , i f  our decis ion rule 
is to find an effect when the test is positive at any site for 
either dose  for either sex, then the true <t. can be greatly 
elevated . 
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9/  Robert Harris , T .  Page , and N .  Reiches , "Carcinogenic 
llazards of  Organic Chemicals in Drinking Water , " in Origins of 
Human Cancer , Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory , Cold Spring Harbor , 
N . Y . , 1977 ; Talbot Page , R . H .  Harris , and J .  Bruser , "Removal of
Carcinogens from Drinking Water ; A Cos t -Benefit Analysis , "  in 
Scientific Basis for Health and Safety Regulation , Brookings 
Institution , Washington,  D. C . , forthcoming ; Talbot Page 
R . H .  Harris , and S . S .  Ep,s tein ,  "Drinking Water and Cancer
Mortality in Louisana , 'Science , Vol . 193 , 2 July 1976 ; Talbot 
Page and R . H .  Harris , "S tatis tical Analys is of  Cancer Mortality 
in Louis iana" in "The Implications of Cancer-Causing Subs tances  
in Mississippi River Water , "The Environmental Defense Fund , 
Washington , D. C . , Nov . 197 4 .  
1 0 /  The results of  a power analysis can b e  represented a s  a
surfac e  in three dimens ional space with coordinates d.. , � .  and
the magnitude of effect . Figure 1 shows a slice of the surface 
with the magnitude of effect held constant , and Figure 2 shows 
another s lice with a. held constant . 
1 1 /  With the definition of D, we can s ay that a zero-infinity 
<IIlemma is a decision problem where both N and D are "high . "  
12/  For a discus sion of  how the underlying rarity dilutes the 
power of a test see  Donald Weiner et al . ,  "Correlations Among 
His tory of An�ina , "  The New En land Journa l o f  Medicine , Vol .  301  
No . 5 ,  and the editor a n t e same s sue , w c ma es the 
application of Bayes Theorem . See also , D . R .  Calkins , R . L .  Dixon , 
C . R . Gerber , D .  Zarin , and G . S .  Omenn , " Identification 
Characterization , and Control of Potential Human Carcinogens : 
A Framework for Federal Decision-Making , "  JNCI , Vol . 64 , No . 1 
Jan . 1980 , p .  1 7 2  . 
.!11
14/ 
City 
15/  
Cited  from the Wall  S treet Journal , Thursday , Jan . 19 , p .  38 . 
Letter from Carmen Guarino , to the editor of the American 
Magazine , March 7 ,  1975 . 
Calkins et  al . , "Identification , "  1 98 0 .  
!E_/ For a discuss ion of what is required to mee t the j udicial 
requirement of " substantial evidence in the rulemaking record 
taken as a whole , "  see the recent cotton dus t  decision ,  
A�L-CIO v .  Marshall , No . 78 -1736 ; Cotton Warehouse As sr. . 
v .  Marshall , No . 78- 1736 (Bazelon opinion) . 
1 7 /  One could read , for example , the $ 2 1  million risk asses sment
or the risk of ozone depletion without a clear idea of what the
scientists  j udged to be the level of suspicion for the principl e  
effects of  concern . U . S .  Dept .  o f  Transpor tation , Climatic Impact 
As ses sment Program (1975 )  series of s ix monographs , available 
from National Technical Information Service ,  Springfield , Va . 
